And, they said, courts have offered different opinions as to how and when the legal system should handle "cumulative error" claims alleging different types of Constitutional violations all at once. Gene Wu, and the United Kingdom all filed briefs supporting Carty's appeal. Most Popular. I would like to thank all those overseas, Italy and France, for their support for the death row prisoners.
I would also like to apologize to Lori for the second time for her husband dying at my hand. To the White family and to Tashell for not being there, I Love you. Final statement: "Dear Heavenly Father, please forgive them for they know not what they do. Last statement: "I am very thankful for all the hard work the Mexican consulate put in a fight over my death sentence if there was a reason or not.
I am thankful for the humane treatment that I was given here at the two prisons that I was at. I am getting my gold watch that it took the Governor 30 years to forge.
Thank you God, Lord send me a chariot. I ask for forgiveness to the Thomas Family for my past choices I made. Please find it in your hearts to forgive me. So I now pray and I will keep you all in my prayers. I hope you find it in your heart to forgive me. To my supporters Daniel, brother Charlie, Steve and all who stood by me, thank you. The appellant had told her the previous January that she had had a miscarriage.
Enid also testified that the appellant arrived at her house in a taxi cab between and a. Based upon the above discussion, the following non-accomplice evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to "tend to connect" the appellant to the commission of the victim's kidnapping and murder:.
The appellant lived two apartment numbers down from the victim in the same complex. One of the accomplices answered a cell phone during the commission of the offense and stated that "she" was outside and asked her if she wanted "it. The appellant's cell phone records reflect seven calls made between the appellant's phone and a phone that may have been used by accomplice Anderson between a.
Cabrera testified that the intruders broke in around 1 a. The appellant was obsessed with having a baby and lied about being pregnant to many people, including her daughter and husband. In the days before the offense, the appellant told many people that she was pregnant and that her baby was due in the next couple of days.
The appellant told many people that she expected to deliver a baby boy on the day before the kidnapping. On the evening of May 15, , about 5 hours before the kidnapping, the appellant told the manager at her storage unit that she had already delivered the baby and that he was at home with his father. The appellant retrieved a baby blanket and two sets of baby clothes from her storage unit on the evening of May 15, She was driving the Pontiac Sunfire rental car in which the victim's body was found the next evening.
Hours before the kidnapping, the appellant was sitting outside of the apartment complex in the Pontiac Sunfire and there was an infant's car seat in the back. The appellant arrived at her mother's house in a taxi around 8 or a.
The appellant told police that she might have loaned cars to people involved in the instant offense. On the evening of May 16, the appellant led police to the house where the Cavalier and the Sunfire were located. The baby was found in the Cavalier and the victim was found in the trunk of the Sunfire. The appellant had driven both of these cars in the days and hours before and after the kidnapping. The appellant was seen in possession of a gun similar in appearance to the gun found at the house on Van Zandt.
Ammunition fitting such gun was found in the diaper bag which was found in the Cavalier with the baby. The appellant asked a fellow inmate to write a letter which represented that it had been written by someone else and stated that the appellant had been set up.
Thus, even without the testimony of the witnesses who were potentially accomplices, the evidence "tends to connect" the appellant to the commission of the crime.
In points of error three and four, the appellant claims that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that Anderson, Caston, and Combs were not accomplices.
The appellant argues these points together with her first and second points, on the theory that the evidence does not sufficiently "tend to connect" the appellant to the crime without the testimony of these accomplices. Because we hold the evidence tends to connect the appellant to the crime without relying on the testimony of any of the alleged accomplices, points of error three and four are moot. We also note that legal and factual sufficiency reviews are appropriate for assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an element of the offense charged.
Points of error three and four are overruled. In points of error five and seven, the appellant claims the trial court abridged her right to confrontation as embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it refused to permit defense counsel to cross-examine Robinson and Combs, alleged accomplice-witnesses, using their prior inconsistent videotaped statements. During the cross-examinations of Robinson and Combs the appellant sought to play each witness's entire videotaped statement to refresh his memory and to impeach him with inconsistencies.
The trial court denied the appellant's requests to play the statements before the jury. The right to confrontation might be denied when appropriate cross-examination is improperly limited.
Here, the appellant was permitted to impeach Robinson and Combs with the contents of their statements made to the police. Additionally, she was permitted to and did call to the stand the officers who took the statements to question them about inconsistencies between the witnesses' statements and their trial testimony.
The appellant sought to have the videotapes played in their entirety and did not make any effort to edit the tapes or identify which portions of the tapes were appropriate for impeachment. It is not the responsibility of the trial court "to sort through and edit the videotapes in order to determine which statements might impeach the witness. Moreover, the appellant does not demonstrate the proper predicate was laid to establish the impeachment value of the tapes. Under the Rules of Evidence, the use of extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement "is contingent upon the witness's response when confronted with the alleged inconsistent statement.
The proper predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement requires that the witness first be asked if he made the contradictory statement at a certain place and time, and to a certain person. If the witness denies making the contradictory statement, it can then be proved by the prior inconsistent statement.
If the witness admits the prior inconsistent statement, however, the prior statement is not admissible. The rationale behind the predicate is that "[w]hen the contradictions are confessed, evidently there is no use or purpose for the impeaching testimony; for this work [the witness] performs upon himself.
The appellant argues that the trial court did not permit her to lay the proper predicate because it would not allow her to play the videotaped statements for the witnesses to review. However, Rule a does not require that a witness be allowed to review a prior inconsistent statement, but only that a prior inconsistent written statement be provided to opposing counsel on request. Our review of the record reveals that, while the witnesses equivocated about making some of the alleged prior inconsistent statements, they conceded and explained most of the claimed inconsistencies.
The appellant does not point to any statement by the witnesses at trial denying a statement that was actually made on the tape.
She therefore fails to show that the videotaped statements had impeachment value or that her right to cross-examination was improperly limited by the trial court. Points of error five and seven are overruled. In her ninth point of error, the appellant claims the trial court abridged her right to confrontation as embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it refused to permit defense counsel to cross-examine Caston, an alleged accomplice-witness, using his prior inconsistent videotaped statement.
The appellant did not offer Caston's videotaped statement for record purposes. By failing to make an offer of proof, the appellant failed to preserve this issue for review. In points of error six, eight, and ten, the appellant claims the same violations under the Texas Constitution that are alleged in points of error five, seven, and nine under the United States Constitution. Because the appellant does not provide separate argument and authority under the Texas Constitution, she has forfeited these claims.
In her eleventh point of error, the appellant claims her counsel was ineffective by failing to make an offer of proof of Caston's videotaped statement. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show 1 that counsel's performance was deficient; and 2 that the deficient performance prejudiced the appellant. During direct examination, Caston conceded that he had lied in making his videotaped statement and agreed that he did not tell the police everything he knew because he was afraid of going back to prison.
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Caston about his videotaped statement. Caston did not disagree with defense counsel's characterizations of his responses on the videotaped statement, and gave explanations for those that were confusing or otherwise inconsistent with his testimony.
The appellant does not point to any place in the record where Caston denied an inconsistency between his testimony and his videotaped statement. As discussed previously, when a witness admits to a prior inconsistency, extrinsic evidence of the inconsistency is not allowed. In addition, the appellant fails to prove how the outcome of her appeal would have been different had counsel preserved the issue.
Point of error eleven is overruled. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Articles refer to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Cathey v. State , S. Solomon v. State , 49 S. Gribble v. McDuff v. Specifically, the defendant claims that Robinson was an accomplice as a matter of law and that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Anderson, Caston, and Combs were not accomplices.
In the alternative, the appellant claims that Anderson, Caston, and Combs were accomplices as a matter of fact. Hearsay objections precluded testimony as to the name of the person to whom the phone was registered, but testimony suggested that the phone was used by Anderson or was at least associated with Anderson. See Malik v. Carroll v. Lopez v. State , 18 S. Linda Carty, 57, has a high profile in Texas as one of just six women facing execution in the state and as a British citizen by dint of her birth in St Kitts at a time when the Caribbean island was still a British colony.
Her case has been highlighted in documentaries and championed by the likes of Bianca Jagger and the British government. Previous attempts to appeal her death sentence have failed, despite the absence of any forensic evidence against her and the fact that she was represented at trial by a defense lawyer who spent only two weeks preparing the case. To see more, visit KUT Search Query Show Search. Show Search Search Query. Play Live Radio. Next Up:. Available On Air Stations.
All Streams. KUT Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email. From Texas Standard : Texas news outlets often report on death penalty stories, given that the state leads the nation in prisoner executions.
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